BACKGROUND

TRIBES OF THE LOWER KLAMATH RIVER SYSTEM -

QUESTION OF TREATIES

• Under the California Land Settlement Act of 1851, "each and every person claiming lands in California by virtue of any right or title derived from the Spanish or Mexican government" was required to submit a claim to a three-person commission. Act of March 3, 1851, ch. XLI ' 8, 9 Stat.631. This provision was interpreted to include Indian tribes. In 1900, the Supreme Court affirmed a California court's confirmation of title of non-Indian claimants against Mission Indians claiming a right of permanent occupancy to the same lands. In Barker v. Harvey, 181 U.S. 481 (1900), the Supreme Court indicated that the Indian right of occupancy should be considered as a "right or title derived from the...Mexican government" even though that right may have antedated the establishment of the Mexican government. The Indians' right of occupancy was deemed abandoned for failure to present it to the land claims commission. Twenty-four years later, the Supreme Court declined to overrule Barker because of the unsettling effect it would have upon property titles in California. United States v. Title Ins.& Trust Co., 265 U.S. 472, 486 (1924). See also   Summa Corp. v. California Ex Rel. Lands Comm'n, 466 U.S. 198 (1984)

• The treaties of the 1850s were not ratified by the Senate.   In 1851, 18 treaties were signed with 400 California Indian leaders whereby millions of acres of land were ceded to the federal government in exchanged for perpetual use and occupancy to 8.5 million acres in reservation land, plus goods and services. These treaties were never ratified by the U.S. Senate. More on the 18 treaties, Report (1) (2) ; California Indians v. US (1941) 98 Ct. Cols, 583, and California Jurisdiction Act of May 18, 1928 Court awarded 7 cents an acre as compensation for the 8.5 million acres of land which was never set up as reservations under the 18 “lost treaties”. From this sum was deducted the cost of administration of the claims. Amount of Judgment: $17,053,941.98,  Offsets: $12,029,099.64 (See Solicitor's opinion Mach 17, 1948.)

  1851 Treaty made at Camp Klamath at the junction of the Trinity and Klamath Rivers with the Lower Klamath tribes (unratified);  Treaty made on Oct. 6, 1851 in Scott's Valley, Shasta, County, Calif. between Redick McKee and the chiefs, captains and head men of the Upper klamath, Shasta and Scotts River tribes of Indians (unratified); Treaty made on October 6, 1851 at Camp Klamath at the Junction of the Klamath and Trinity Rivers between Redick McKee and the chiefs, captains and head men of the POH-IK or Lower Klamath tribes of Indians (unratified).

• See Solicitor's memo 8/1/1960 

  "The United States has accepted the fact that it long ago acquired the lands of the California Indians, extinguishing their Indian title. The Act of May 18, 1928, 45 Stat. 602, authorized the attorney general of the state of California to bring suit in the Court of Claims on behalf of the "Indians of California" for claims they might have against the United States "by reason of land's taken from them in the state of California by the United States without compensation . . .," any decree to be based upon the compensation proposed in certain ratified treaties of 1851-1852. Section 3 of that act provides: "Any payment which may have been made by the United States or moneys heretofor or hereafter expended . . . for the benefit of the Indians of California, made under specific appropriations for the support . . . of Indians of California, including purchases of land, . . . may be pleaded by way of set-off`."

  "The Court of Claims decided October 5, 1942, that the California Indians were entitled to recover as compensation the sum of $10,648,625, for 8,518,900 acres taken, less $764,033.50 for lands "set aside by the United States for the plaintiff Indians as reservations and otherwise, by Executive Orders, Acts of Congress . . ." 98 C. Cls. 583, Cert. Den. 319 U.S. 764, 102 C. Cls. 837. The court held that whatever lands those Indians may have held "became a part of the public domain . . ." because the Indians did not qualify before the Commission set up by the Act of March 3, 1851 (9 Stat. 631) to settle private land claims in California. (p. 592)
  
  "It will be noted that this action in favor of the California Indian's is not a payment for money due the Indians, since the basis of the litigation and judgment is that these Indians lost their rights by reason of lathes. Nor did this involve all lands of the California Indians. The payment is in the nature of a gift, equitable because the United States Senate failed to ratify an agreement with the Indians concerning those particular lands. The claims of the California Indians, based upon aboriginal title, is now in process of litigation. This suit also is based upon acquisition of the Indians' lands by the United States.

  

• 1995 On Petituion for a writ of Certiorari to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (Denied) Whether the Yurok and Hoopa Valley Tribes have federally protected fishing rights that the Secretary of Commerce must take into account as "other applicable law" under the Magnuson Act, 16 U.S.C. 1854(a)(l), in setting harvest levels for
  Klamath River salmon.(Parravano, et al. v. Masten, et al No. 94-16727 (9th Cir., Nov. 16, 1995)

• Parravano v. Babbitt, 70 F.3d 539, 545 (U.S. App. 1995); cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1016 (1996)

• Testimony of Neal A. McCaleb Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs before the Committee on Indian Affairs United States Senate on the Hoopa-Yurok Settlement Act August 1, 2002

• 2003 Hoopa-Yurok Mediation Agreement: Proposed Amendments to the Hoopa-Yurok Settlement Act Developed Jointly by the tribes in Formal Mediation (December 3, 2003).

MIDDLE KLAMATH

• The 1864 "Yreka Treaty" negotiated by Elijah Stelle with the Klamath,  Modoc, Shasta, Hamburg and Scott Valley tribes was declared invalid -

• In 1906 , land was purchased by the U.S. government for use as "rancherias" by some of the Indian population who were assigned to reside on the "rancherias."; Quartz Valley

• Establishment Shasta and Upper Klamath Indian Reservation (Quartz Valley) Oct. 18 1938; By virtue of authority contained in Section 7 of the Indian Reorganization Act of June 18, 1934 (48 Stat. L., 984), the lands described below, acquired by purchase under the provisions of Section 5 of that Act, for the use and benefit of such Shasta and Upper Klamath Indians eligible to participate in the benefits of the Act of June 18, 1934, supra, as shall be designated by the Secretary of the Interior, are hereby proclaimed to be an Indian reservation:

• August 18, 1958 the California Rancheria Act, PL 85-671    [H. R. 2824] 72 Stat. 619:: Solicitor's memo 8/1/1960

• VOLUME 21—1956 Termination of Federal Supervision over the property of the Western Oregon Tribes (Karok) and Bands of Indians of Oregon, and the Individual Members Thereof

• VOLUME 32—1967 January 13, 1967 Quartz Valley Rancheria, CA.Notice of Termination of Federal Supervision Over Property and Individual Members Thereof

• Tillie Hardwick vs. United States (restoration of reservation status)

UPPER KLAMATH

• The Klamath Tribe: 1864 Treaty (1) (2) ; October 14, 1864, United States Statutes at Large, Volume XVI, page 707. Tribe: Klamath and Modok tribes and Yahooskin band of Snake Indians. Description of cession or reservation: Cede territory within the following boundaries: Beginning at the point where the 44ø N. latitude crosses the summit of Cascade mountains; thence following the main dividing ridge of said mountains in a southerly direction to the ridge which separates the waters of Pitt and McCloud rivers from the waters on the N.; thence along said dividing ridge in an easterly direction to the southern end of Goose lake; thence northeasterly to the northern end of Harney lake; thence due N. to 44ø N. latitude; thence W. to the place of beginning. Reserve, until it is otherwise directed by President of U. S., a tract bounded as follows: Beginning upon the eastern shore of the middle Klamath lake at the Point of Rocks, about 12 miles below the mouth of Williamson's river; thence following up said eastern shore to the mouth of Wood river; thence up Wood river to a point 1 mile N. of the bridge at Fort Klamath; thence due E. to the summit of the ridge which divides the upper and middle Klamath lakes; thence along said ridge to a point due E. [W.] of the N. end of the upper lake; thence due E., passing the said N. end of the upper lake, to the summit of the mountains on the E. side of the lake; thence along said mountain to the point where Sprague's river is intersected by the Ish-tish-ea-wax creek; thence in a southerly direction to the summit of the mountain the extremity of which forms the Point of Rocks; thence along said mountain to the place of beginning. (Historical data and remarks: This constitutes the present Klamath reservation. The boundaries had not been determined when the map was drawn (1895), the plat shown being that given temporarily by the General Land Office.)

• For 20 years, until 1887, the Klamath lived on their reservation under the terms of the 1864 treaty. In 1887 Congress passed the General Allotment Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (current version at 25 U.S.C. § 331-34, 348, 349, 381 (1976)), which fundamentally changed the nature of land ownership on the Klamath Reservation. Prior to the Act, the tribe held the reservation land in communal ownership. Pursuant to the terms of the Allotment Act, however, parcels of tribal land were granted to individual Indians in fee. Under the allotment system, approximately 25% of the original Klamath Reservation passed from tribal to individual Indian ownership. Over time, many of these individual allotments passed into non-Indian ownership.

    June 17, 1901 agreement

• The next major change in the pattern of land ownership on the Klamath Reservation occurred in 1954 when Congress approved the Klamath Termination Act. Act of Aug. 13, 1954, c. 732, § 1, 68 Stat. 718 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 564-564w (1976)).United States Code Title 25 - Indians, Chapter 14. Miscellaneous, subchapter XIII, Klamath Tribe; Termination of Federal Supervision; Section 566. Under this Act, tribe members could give up their interest in tribal property for cash. A large majority of the tribe chose to do this. In order to meet the cash obligation, in 1961, the United States purchased much of the former Klamath Reservation. The balance of the reservation was placed in a private trust for the remaining tribe members. See Kimball I, 493 F.2d at 567 (describing termination process); Klamath and Modoc Tribes v. United States, 436 F.2d 1008, 1010-13 (Ct.Cl.) (same), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950, 92 S.Ct. 271, 30 L.Ed.2d 267 (1971). In 1973, to complete implementation of the Klamath Termination Act, the United States condemned most of the tribal land held in trust. Payments from the condemnation proceeding and sale of the remaining trust land went to Indians still enrolled in the tribe. This final distribution of assets essentially extinguished the original Klamath Reservation as a source of tribal property.
  
  Even though the Klamath Tribe no longer holds any of its former reservation, the United States still holds title to much of the former reservation lands. In 1958 the Government purchased approximately 15,000 acres of the Klamath Marsh, the heart of the former reservation, to establish a migratory bird refuge under the jurisdiction of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service. Pub.L. No. 85-731, 72 Stat. 816 (1958) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 564w-1 (1976)). In 1961 and again in 1973, the Government purchased large forested portions of the former Klamath Reservation. This forest land became part of the Winema National Forest under the jurisdiction of the United States Forest Service. 25 U.S.C. § 564w-1 (d), 564w-2 (1976). By these two purchases, the Government became the owner of approximately 70% of the former reservation lands. The balance of the reservation is in private, Indian and non-Indian, ownership either through allotment or sale of reservation lands at the time of termination.

• Restoration of Federal recognition, rights, and privileges; 

• Kimball v. Callahan, 590 F.2d. 768 (1979), Treaty rights survived the Termination Act

• Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n
  United States of America 99 S.Ct. 3055 (1979)

• U.S. v. Adair, 478 F. Supp. 336, 345 (D. Or. 1979) (Adair I). In Article I of the Treaty, the Tribes reserved their traditional right to hunt, fish, trap, and gather edible plants on the Reservation, id. at 339, which Judge Solomon found was one of the primary purposes of the Reservation. Id. at 345. He also held that under the Winters doctrine of federal reserved water rights, when the United States reserved land to create the Reservation, it also reserved enough unappropriated water to fulfill the purpose of the Reservation. Id.

• U.S.   v. Adair, (AdairII) 723 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1983); The court noted that the federal water right reserved by the Treaty is a non-consumptive use that entitles the Tribes to "prevent other appropriators from depleting the streams waters below a protected level in any area where the non-consumptive right applies." Id. at 1411. The court interpreted Adair I as confirming "to the Tribe the amount of water necessary to support its hunting and fishing rights as currently exercised to maintain the livelihood of the Tribe members, not as these rights once were exercised by the Tribe in 1864." Id. The court explained that the Tribes are entitled to enough of the resource to maintain a "moderate living." Id. at 1415 (citing Washington v. Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 99 S.Ct. 3055, 61 L.Ed.2d 823 (1979), which cites Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 83 S.Ct. 1468, 10 L.Ed.2d 542 (1963)). However, the court left open, as did the district court, how much water would satisfy the Tribes' right.

• Adair III (2002) The court held that the Tribes "have reserved gathering rights, along with supporting water," with a priority date of time immemorial.

• 9th Circuit Court vacates Adair decision (July 23, 2003) Court stated Oregon District Court Judge Owen Panner erred by citing 25-year old opinions of the U.S. District Court for Oregon and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals because the tribe had conveyed away those rights years ago.The Court also stated; "nor should he have given a judgment in favor of the Tribes which expanded upon those rights." The earlier decisions Judge Panner had relied upon giving the tribes certain rights to the water hinged on the Tribes' dependence upon the water for daily sustenance, which opponents argued is no longer the case. As Modified on Denial of Rehearing January 24, 1984

• Oregon Fish & Wildlife Dept. v. Klamath Tribe 473 U.S. 753 (1985)

• No. 95-151  Klamath Tribe v. State of Oregon petition for writ of certiorari

• Klamath Tribes v. U.S. et al. Civ. No. 96-381-HA (D. Or., Oct. 2, 1996)

• U.S. Ct. of Appeals, 9th Circuit, Klamath Water Users v. Patterson. Wirkus (BoR)
  No. 98-35708 argued July 12, 1999--Portland, Oregon

  "The Irrigators claim PacifiCorp does not have a legal duty to operate the Dam to meet its ESA obligation. The district court held that the Irrigators' rights to water are subservient to the ESA. See Klamath, 15 F. Supp. 2d at 995."

  "Because Reclamation retains authority to manage the Dam, and because it remains the owner in fee simple of the Dam, it has responsibilities under the ESA as a federal agency. These responsibilities include taking control of the Dam when necessary to meet the requirements of the ESA, requirements that override the water rights of the Irrigators. Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not err in concluding that Reclamation has the authority to direct Dam
  operations to comply with the ESA "

  "The Irrigators aver that the existence of the Tribes' senior water rights are irrelevant to the current dispute, and that the district court's conclusion that the Tribes have senior water rights should be vacated. The district court found that the Irrigators' water rights were subservient to senior tribal water rights. See Klamath, 15 F. Supp. 2d at 996."0
  
  "Similar to its duties under the ESA, the United States, as a trustee for the Tribes, has a responsibility to protect their rights and resources. See, e.g., United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1408-11, 1415 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that the Klamath Basin Tribes hold implied water rights to support hunting and fishing rights guaranteed by treaties between Tribes in Oregon and California and United States)."
  
  "We have held that water rights for the Klamath Basin Tribes "carry a priority date of time immemorial. " Adair, 723 F.2d at 1414. Because Reclamation maintains control of the Dam, it has a responsibility to divert the water and resources needed to fulfill the Tribes' rights, rights that take precedence over any alleged rights of the Irrigators. Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not err in concluding that Reclamation has the authority to direct operation of the Dam to comply with Tribal water requirements."

• Department of the Interior v. Klamath Water Users Association, No. 99-1871 (2001).

• Klamath Tribe - BIA claims to water; Klamath River Basin Compact

CASE LAW

• Links to significant Indian cases

• Johnson v. McIntosh 8 Wheat. 543 (1823) This U.S. Supreme Court decision states that the U.S. government has ultimate title to Indian lands based on European’s law to the right of discovery. The text reads: “This opinion conforms precisely to the principle which has been supposed to be recognized by all European governments, from the first settlement of America. The absolute ultimate title has been considered as acquired by discovery, subject only to the Indian title of occupancy, which title the discoverers possessed the exclusive right of acquiring. Such a right is no more incompatible with a seisin in fee, than a lease for years, and might as effectually bar an ejectment.”

• Cherokee Nation v. Georgia (1831) In 1831 the US Supreme Court issued a decision that defined Native Americans as "domestic dependant nations" instead of foreign nations. This redesignation allowed states, such as Georgia, to disenfranchise Native American tribes of their lands. The Supreme Court refused to intervene stating that the Cherokee Nation didn't have control of their lands, because they were not a foreign nation with sovereignty rights. The "Cherokee Tribe is a state in the sense that it is a "distinct political society," but is not a foreign state within the meaning of Article III of the Constitution. It is more like a "domestic dependent nation" with the relation of the tribe to the Federal government like that of "ward to guardian." The tribes are separate nations within a nation."

• Worcester v. Georgia 31 U.S. 515 (1832)  In an opinion delivered by Chief Justice John Marshall, the Court held that the Georgia act, under which Worcester was prosecuted, violated the Constitution, treaties, and laws of the United States. Noting that the "treaties and laws of the United States contemplate the Indian territory as completely separated from that of the states; and provide that all intercourse with them shall be carried on exclusively by the government of the union," Chief Justice Marshall argued, "The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community occupying its own territory in which the laws of Georgia can have no force. The whole intercourse between the United States and this nation, is, by our constitution and laws, vested in the government of the United States." The Georgia act thus interfered with the federal government's authority and was unconstitutional. Justice Henry Baldwin dissented for procedural reasons and on the merits.

• Ex Parte Crow Dog 109 U.S. 556 (1883) (pre-suspension of treaty authority): The decision rendered in this case was that the U.S. had no jurisdictional authority to prosecute one Indian for killing another on an Indian reservation. The court's determination in this instance led to the extension of federal jurisdiction over Indian Country via the 1885 Major Crimes Act.

• Elk v. Wilkins 1884."...utmost possible effect [of the 1871 Act] is to require the Indian tribes to be dealt with for the future through the legislative and not the treaty-making power."

• United States v. Kagama (1886):(118 U.S. 375) The Congress had an "incontrovertible right" to exercise its plenary authority over Indians as it saw fit.

• Stephen v. Cherokee Nation 1899 The Supreme Court said: "[A]ssuming that Congress possesses plenary power of legislation in regards [Indians], subject only to the Constitution of the United States, it follows that the validity of remedial legislation of this sort cannot be questioned unless in violation of some prohibition of that instrument."

• Lone wolf v. Hitchcock (1903) (187 U.S. 553): The United States, as part of its plenary power over Indian affairs, could abrogate sections of treaties with Indians at any time it chose, with or without Indian consent, and without disturbing the force of the treaty itself.

• United States v. Winans (198 U.S. 371 (1905) Yakima Indian Fishing Rights

• Winters v. United States (207 U.S. 564 (1908) Reserved Water Rights.

• Tee-Hit-Ton v. United States 348 U.S. 272 (1955): Extending the rationalizations offered in Johnson v. McIntosh, Justice Reed delivered the opinion in this case (348 U.S. 272) that the Tee-Hit-Ton band of the Tlingit Nation (in Alaska) could not establish aboriginal title to some 350,000 acres of territory the court acknowledged they had used and occupied since "time immemorial," there being no treaty by which Congress recognized their title. Hence, in the court's view, the Tee-Hit-Tons were not entitled to the land nor the resources upon it. The decision neatly finished the U.S. reversal of the "Discovery Doctrine" principle concerning who conveys title to whom in North America and effectively gutted whatever was left of aboriginal rights in U.S. jurisprudence.

• Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963)

• Colorado Water Conservation District v U.S. 424 U.S. 800 (1976) The McCarran Amendment, passed by Congress in 1952, consents to the joinder of the United States as a defendant in Federal and State court adjudications of water rights. In Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States (1976), the Supreme Court ruled that although Federal courts continue to have concurrent jurisdiction, the McCarran Amendment provides State courts with jurisdiction to adjudicate Indian water rights held in trust by the United States.

• U.S. v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978; ) Limited the extent of reserved water rights for Federal, non-Indian reservations of land (such as National Forests). Reserved water rights for these non-Indian reservations are limited to the primary purposes for which the reservation was created, i.e., those purposes actually stated. Water rights necessary for secondary uses must be obtained pursuant to State law. The courts still must determine the extent to which these limitations apply to reserved water rights for Indian reservations. "Implied-reservation-of-water doctrine" spoke to implied water use rights associated with the portions of the public domain that have been withdrawn and reserved by the United States for use as Indian reservations, forest reserves, national parks, and national monuments. Such implication of "reserved water"  is to water necessary to achieve the specific federal purposes for which these reservations were made.no more. The right referred to   "appurtenant water then unappropriated to the extent needed to accomplish the purpose of the reservation." Cappaert, supra, at 138 (emphasis added). See Arizona v. California, supra, at 595-601; United States v. District Court for Eagle County 401 U.S. 520, 522 -523 (1971); Colorado River Water Cons. Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 805 (1976). Where water is only valuable for a secondary use of the reservation, the United States would acquire water in the same manner as any other public or private appropriator. [The case denied U.S. claims to reservation of minimum instream flows for aesthetic, recreational, and fish-preservation purposes as not among the organic purposes of the national Forests.]

• Washington v. Fishing Vessel Assn., 443 U.S. 658 (1979)

• Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe 463 U.S. 545 (1983)  In its 1983 decision in Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, the Supreme Court held that the McCarran Amendment allows State adjudication of Indian water rights even in those States that expressly have disclaimed jurisdiction in their constitutions or enabling acts. It should be noted that the McCarran Amendment allows joinder of tribes only in general stream adjudications- -comprehensive actions in which all potential water users in a watershed are joined. In addition, the statute confers judicial jurisdiction only.

• Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band 000 U.S. 97-1337 (1997)

• Montana v. United States,450 US544 (1981)

• Klamath Water Users Association v. Patterson (15 F. Supp. 2d 990, 996 (D. Or. 1998), 204 F.3d 1206 (9 Cir. 2000) that BOR is legally obligated to operate the Project “to meet the requirements of the ESA, requirements that override the water rights of the Irrigators.” The court relied on the principal that “contractual arrangements can be altered by subsequent Congressional legislation” even when the legislation was passed after the contracts were made.

• No. 99-1871 US DOI and BIA v. Klamath Water Users Protective Assoc. Writ of Certiorari

• Kandra v. U.S.

• Klamath Irrigation District  v. U.S. 2/28/05

GENERAL INDIAN LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

• Trade and Intercourse Acts (1790-1834): This series of statutes, beginning with ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137 (now codified at 25 U.S.C. 177), served to codify the constitutional Commerce Clause, providing the federal government with tools to enforce its regulatory authority over its citizens in their interactions with native peoples. The 1790 Act was succeeded by other statutes in 1793, 1796, 1799, 1802, and 1834. Supplemental legislation, elaborating federal authority to punish U.S. citizens guilty of non-commercial crimes "in Indian Country," was enacted in 1802 and 1834. Over time, interpretation of these laws by federal courts came to be seen as binding upon the conduct of Indians as well as U.S. nationals.

• The Indian Removal Act (1830): This Act (ch. 148, 4 Stat. 411), passed on May 28, 1830, provided for "an exchange of lands with any of the Indians residing in any of the states and territories, and for their removal west of the river Mississippi." It was used as a basis by Andrew Jackson, in defiance of a Supreme Court opinion to set in motion the mass forced relocations of the Creek, Cherokee, Choctaw, Chickasaw, Seminole and scores of other American Indian nations located east of the Mississippi during the 1830s.

• Suspension of Treaty-Making (1871): It was in 1867 that the House considered passing legislation to repeal the authority given the President, the Secretary of the Interior and the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to make treaties with Indian nations. Many Congressmen regarded treaties with Indian nations as creating a two-fold problem: Rapidly increasing demands for revenues in a time of budgetary restraint following the Civil War; and allowing the U.S. Senate to usurp the Constitutional power of the House by creating new budgetary demands through treaties. Failing to win passage of the bill to restrain the Executive branch from making treaties, and thus unable to restrain the Senate as the Constitutionally empowered body of Congress responsible for treaty ratification, the debate continued. A compromise bill was subsequently introduced as an attachment to the Indian Appropriation Act of 1871 (ch. 120, 16 Stat. 544, 566 now codified at 25 U.S.C. 71): "[N]o Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the United States shall [henceforth] be recognized as an independent nation, tribe, or power with whom the United States may contract by treat: Provided further, That nothing herein contained shall be construed to invalidate or impair the obligation of any treaty heretofore lawfully made with any such Indian nation or tribe."
  
  The passage of the Appropriation Act into law effectively stopped making new treaties with Indian nations and severed formal government-to-government relations between the U.S. and Indian nations. While satisfying the political concerns of Congressmen worried about Senate usurpation, the breaking of government-to-government connections with Indian nations posed dilemmas for the U.S. government:? were legal means available for the United States to legally acquire Indian lands, and could the government deal with the growing number of civil and criminal problems involving U.S. citizens in Indian territories.? A string of court cases resulting from these dilemmas appeared in the federal courts.

• 1885 Major Crimes Act (Criminal jurisdiction in Indian Country is now governed by federal law set out primarily in Title 18 of the United States Code at Sections 1151, 1152, and 1153. Under these statutes, the United States expressly retained jurisdiction over major crime committed by Indians and crimes against Indians committed by non-Indians. Under Supreme Court interpretations of these statutes, jurisdiction over crimes between non-Indians, even though occurring in Indian Country, is vested in states. SEE PL-280 for California )

• The General Allotment Act (1887): By this measure (ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388, now codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. 331 et seq.; also known as the "Dawes Act" or "Dawes Severalty Act"), the U.S.  broke up traditional systems of collective land tenure. In order to retain land, native people were compelled to accept individually deeded land parcels. "Full Blood Indians" were deeded with "trust patents," over which the government exercised complete control for a minimum of twenty-five years; "Mixed Blood Indians" were deeded with "patents in fee simple," over which they exercised rights, but were forced to accept U.S. citizenship in the process. The balance of reserved Indian land was opened up to non-Indian homesteading, corporate utilization, or incorporation into national parks and forests. Between 1887 and 1934, approximately two-thirds (100 million acres) of all Indian-reserved land was appropriated by the government through the mechanism.

• The Reclamation Act of 1902

• Indians were granted citizenship pursuant to the Indian Citizenship Act of 1924 (8 U.S.C. §1401). Later amendments clarified that the Act applied to Alaska Natives, as well. "BE IT ENACTED by the Senate and house of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That all non citizen Indians born within the territorial limits of the United States be, and they are hereby, declared to be citizens of the United States: Provided That the granting of such citizenship shall not in any manner impair or otherwise affect the right of any Indian to tribal or other property. (Approved June 2, 1924)"

• The Wheeler-Howard Act, June 18, 1934 (The Indian Reorganization Act) and Amendments.

• Indian Claims Commission Act of August 13, 1946 (60 Stat. 1049, 1050; 25 U.S.C.A. 70a)

• An Act Granting the consent of Congress to the Klamath River Basin Compact between the States of California and Oregon, and for related purposes.Public Law 85-222 August 30, 1957 | [S. 2431] 71 Stat. 497

• Kuchel Act  (16 U.S.C. §§695k-695r) Public Law 88-567, Act of September 2, 1964, 78 Stat. 850

• July 2, 1965 Indian Property in California Adoption and Application of State Laws

• The Indian Civil Rights Act (1968): While it negated many of the worst potentialities of termination policy, the Indian Civil Rights Act (P.L. 90-284; 82 Stat. 77, codified in part at 25 U.S.C. 1301 et seq. )

• Indian Self Determination and Education Act of 1973 Public Law 93-638, 25 U.S.C. 450 et seq  (signed January 4, 1975; 88 Stat. 2203; 42 U.S.C. 450-458) as amended by P.L. 100-202, P.L. 101-301, P.L. 100-446, P.L. 100-472, P.L. 100-581, and P.L. 101-644. This Act recognized the obligation of the United States to provide for maximum participation by Native Americans in Federal Indian programs and services to Indian communities, including education. It establishes a goal to provide education and services to permit Indian children to compete and achieve self-determination.
  Whereas the Act originally applied only to the activities and programs of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, P.L. 100-472 (102 Stat. 2285) expanded it to all bureaus within the Department of the Interior. This law declares a commitment to the maintenance of the Federal Government's unique and continuing relationship with, and responsibility to, individual Indians and Tribes. The Secretary of the Interior is directed, upon the request of any Indian Tribe, to enter into self-determination contracts with Tribal organizations to plan, conduct, and administer programs, including those which the Department is authorized to administer for the benefit of Indians because of their status as Indians.

• The Indian Child Welfare Act (1978): (P.L. 95-608; 92 Stat. 3069, codified at 25 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.)

• Public Law 83-280 (67 Stat. 588). (a.k.a PL 280) treatise transfer of criminal and other jurisdiction to California and other states.

• The Tribal Self Governance Act of 1994, 25 U.S.C. §458 Part D

• Indian Country" Historically, the term “Indian country” has been used to identify land that is subject to the “primary jurisdiction . . . [of] the Federal Government and the Indian tribe inhabiting it.” Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov’t, 522 U.S. 520, 527 n.1 (1998). The U.S. Code defines “Indian country” as:
  
  (a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation …,
  (b) all dependent Indian communities…, and
  (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished…

  (See further discussion by National Indian Gaming Commission)

• Tribal Self-Governance Amendmenst of 2000, P.L 106-260, 8/18/00

• 2003 report Tribal Self-Governance Health Care and Social Services Delivery Effectiveness Evaluation Feasibility Study Legislative History and Development of Tribal Self-Governance and Contracting Revised Report