Commerce Clause Over-ruled (No Federal Power Within a State)
The Commerce Clause in the Constitution is what the US Government uses to justify its meddling with our state's wildlife, specifically migratory species (which travel "interstate") and "endangered" species such as the wolf.
A recent ruling by the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals helps dismantle the Feds contention that the Commerce Clause gives them power within a state. Pete Hendrickson expounds on the significance of this below. The actual 9th Circuit Court published decision is also below.
The Commerce Clause Argument by Feds OVER-RULED!
By Pete Hendrickson
The 9th circuit court of appeals, which many observers feel has racked up a lot to answer for over the years in terms of bad-- if not wacky--decisions, bought itself a whole lot of redemption recently. Ruling late last year and again in March in a case known as Raich versus Ashcroft, the court enjoined the federal Drug Enforcement Agency from engaging in activities aimed at suppressing California's medical marihuana initiative.
In so doing, the 9th circuit court has significantly served the cause of the rule of law in America.
The authority under which the DEA operates is the Interstate Commerce Clause of Article 1, section 8 of the United States Constitution, which provides Congress with the power to regulate commerce among the states.
"The Congress shall have power. to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes." This is obviously a very limited power. First of all, and undeniably, this power is confined in its reach to 'commerce', and only such commerce as involves two or more of the several states. Thomas Jefferson, discussing a proposal
to create a national bank, expressed the nature of the authority granted by the commerce clause this way:"...if this was [alleged to be] an exercise of the power of regulating commerce, it would be void, as extending as much to the internal commerce of every State, as to its external. For the power given to Congress by the Constitution does not extend to the internal regulation of the commerce of a State, (that is to say of the commerce between citizen and citizen,) which remain exclusively with its own legislature; but to its external commerce only, that is to say, its commerce with another State, or with foreign nations, or with the Indian tribes."
John Marshall, first chief justice of the United States Supreme Court described his understanding of the meaning and limitations of the commerce clause in the 1824 case of Gibbons versus Ogden with these words:
"It is not intended to say that these words comprehend that [type of] commerce, which is completely internal, which is carried on between man and man in a State, or between different parts of the same State, and which does not extend to or affect other States. Such a power would be inconvenient, and is certainly unnecessary."
"Comprehensive as the word `among' is, it may very properly be restricted to that commerce which concerns more States than one. . . . The enumeration presupposes something not enumerated; and that something, if we regard the language or the subject of the sentence, must be the exclusively internal commerce of a State."
The limitation of the application of that power to agencies of the several state governments exclusively is more ambiguous, perhaps-- but according to James Madison, the chief architect of the Constitution, the purpose of the clause is "the relief of the States which import and export through other States, from the improper contributions levied on them by the latter"-- in
other words, preventing one State from taxing goods passing through it into another. Taking Madison at his word, and bearing in mind that the Constitution is, technically, a compact between, and in regard to, the several states acting in their corporate capacities-- it could be argued that the commerce clause has no direct application to the actions of private citizens at all, even actions involving 'commerce' between two such citizens across state borders. Seen in this light, such actions would be
subject only to the authority of the respective state governments, with that authority in turn subordinate to that of the federal government to ensure that such commerce is unimpeded. In practical fact, this understanding of the clause reigned more-or-less unchallenged for the first 100 years or more of American history.
During the era of progressivist influence in America-- essentially the first half of the 20th century, a naïve popular faith in the capacity of democratic politics was exploited by rapacious special interests which recognized the opportunities afforded by a government of unlimited power to those who could influence or control its actions. These interests seized upon several elements in the language or construction of the federal Constitution which can be seen as ambiguous, if taken out of context, as
the instruments of their ambitions. Prominent among these was the commerce clause. The original theory under which latitude was found in the clause was that if Congress is authorized to regulate interstate commerce, it can reasonably assert authority over things which affect interstate commerce.This notion found its most promiscuous expression in a Supreme Court ruling in 1942 in the case of Wickard versus Filburn, in which the court accepted the federal government's argument that because the wheat a farmer grew for his own consumption reduced the amount that he himself would otherwise be obliged to buy, such production affected local commerce, which in turn affected regional, and ultimately interstate commerce in that commodity--thus making his decision to plant his own wheat something over which the
feds had lawful authority. Sound absurd and indefensible? It is the regime under which all but the very oldest here have lived for our entire lives.
Happily, this regime is now crumbling. The erosion began in 1995 with the decision in United States versus Lopez, in which the Supreme Court overturned a federal gun control measure criminalizing possession of a gun within 1000 feet of a school. As is true of most federal criminal statutes, this one was being enforced within the several states under the auspices of the commerce clause, a stretch which Lopez bravely and wisely
challenged. The defense offered by the government actually tried to break somewhat new ground from that previously tilled under the clause, since not even as indirect a commerce connection as that deployed to stop farmer Filburn from growing his own wheat could plausibly be proposed for the simple possession of a gun. So, the federal attorneys suggested instead that since the parts from which such guns are made had (presumably) at one
time traveled in interstate commerce, and involved manufacturing capacity, which, on an aggregate basis had a national scope, governmental authority over the gun-- and therefore its owner-- existed, essentially forever and
in all circumstances.The court rejected this contention wholesale. In its' ruling, the court cites John Marshall's language in Gibbons versus
Ogden, regarding the limitation of the clause to matters purely interstate, and then goes on to observe:"Similarly, under the Government's "national productivity" reasoning, Congress could regulate any activity that it found was related to the economic productivity of individual citizens: family law (including marriage, divorce, and child custody), for example. Under the theories that the Government presents in support of 922(q) [the law in question], it is difficult to perceive any limitation on federal power, even in areas such as criminal law enforcement or education where States historically have been sovereign. Thus, if we were to accept the Government's arguments, we are hard-pressed to posit any activity by an individual that Congress is without power to regulate."
Shortly after this decision, the court repeats essentially the same
perspective in striking down a federal assault law, holding that, although the actors whose behavior the government was attempting to reach might be personally involved in interstate commerce, and may even be arguably inhibited in such involvement by the acts being proscribed, it is an
unsupportable stretch of the commerce clause power to thus extend it over individual behavior. In this ruling the court makes another strong statement reflecting its growing intolerance for legislative adventurism in defiance of the clear meaning of Constitutional language:"Congress found that gender-motivated violence affects interstate commerce "by deterring potential victims from traveling interstate, from engaging in employment in interstate business, and from transacting with business, and in places involved in interstate commerce;."
" Given these findings and petitioner's arguments, the concern that we expressed in Lopez that Congress might use the Commerce Clause to completely obliterate the Constitution's distinction between national and local authority seems well founded"
That same year, the court also threw out a long-standing federal law against arson, again rejecting expansive federal claims of authority under the commerce clause.
Now, following in the wake of this refreshing Supreme Court trend, comes the 9th circuit court serving up what may well prove to be the coup-de-grace for the commerce clause's contributions to the exercise of unlimited power by the federal government. Certainly, its recent pair of rulings in Raich versus Ashcroft represent a powerful blow to that regime.
The basic facts of the case are fairly simple. The plaintiffs, Angel
McClary Raich and several associates, grow, supply, and consume marijuana in California, enjoying protection from state harassment by the provisions of the California Medical Marijuana Initiative. That initiative has not dissuaded the federal DEA from abusing them, however, under the auspices of
the Controlled Substances Act-- itself an appendage of the Federal Food and Drug Act, which is one of the oldest federal enactments created under the mantle of the commerce clause. The enactment of the Federal Food and Drug Act, in fact, predates many of the wild flights of fancy tolerated by the
Supreme Court in Wickard and similar cases, and the legislation contains its own statutory definition of 'interstate commerce'; one far more consistent with the founder's views than current administration practices conducted under its authority would suggest. That definition, by the terms of which all federal drug law enforcement is circumscribed, declare 'interstate commerce' to be:(1) commerce between any State or Territory and any place outside thereof, and
(2) commerce within the District of Columbia or within any other Territory not organized with a legislative body,
It is self-evident by the terms of this definition, even without looking to the higher law of the Constitution that the private, in-state growth and consumption of marijuana, or anything else, is outside the purview of this and any dependent federal law such as the Controlled Substances Act. But the DEA is accustomed to friendly, if not compliant courts; more
significantly it is accustomed to ignorant adversaries unaware of the details and limitations of the law. Therefore it proceeded with its high-handed business-as-usual against these peaceable Californians. Raich and her friends, knowing at least the Constitution, if not the nuances of the Federal Food and Drug Act, sought an injunction in the federal courts against future assaults by the agency.
The government, faced with another case involving a completely locally grown, distributed, and consumed item, offered-- concept for concept, if not word for word-- the very argument it used 62 years ago in Wickard versus Filburn. Indeed, in crafting the Controlled Substances Act, or CSA, Congress included a lengthy preamble describing its 'findings' that the
substances-- and the Americans who use them-- over which it wished to exercise power by way of the act partake of the same ephemeral interstate commerce connections and influences which won the day in the Wickard case so long ago. However, recognizing that such 'findings' carry little legal weight and that the CSA remains circumscribed by the Constitution's
language, as well as that within the Food and Drug Act itself, the 9th circuit court, said no, twice.
The appellate court's ruling was not so bold as to cleanly embrace the clarity of Marshall, Madison, or Jefferson, in that it largely confines its focus to the definition of 'commerce', observing that none is involved in the private production and consumption of Raich's marijuana, while dancing around the 'among the states' element of the statute. Even so, the ruling
upholds the principle that the words of the law must be given no more and no less than their meaning, and represents a significant step down the path charted by the Supreme Court in Lopez. Raich versus Ashcroft will now go to the Supreme Court which only last year extended an invitation to the circuit courts for just such a case. Not only is there every reason to expect the high court to be predisposed to uphold the lower court's ruling,
but even if the supremes were inclined to reverse their own recent doctrine, they would have great difficulty overcoming the correctness of the circuit court's reasoning. Thus, a highly significant reining-in of long-standing congressional excess is probably imminent. This will not instantly undo all legislation promulgated under the elastic reading of the commerce clause, but will likely deal much of it an at least slowly fatal wound.
Pete Hendrickson