Pat
O’Toole
President
Family
Farm
Testimony
Before the Subcommittee on Water and Power
Committee
on Resources
Oversight
Hearing
on
The Role of Surface and Groundwater Storage in Providing Reliable
Water
and Power Supplies and Reducing Drought’s Impacts
Chairman Radanovich and Members of the Subcommittee:
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you to discuss the role of
surface and groundwater storage in providing reliable water and power supplies
and reducing drought’s impacts. My name is Patrick O’Toole, and I serve as
the president of the Family Farm Alliance. The
Water users represented by the Family Farm Alliance use a combination of
surface and groundwater supplies, managed through a variety of local, state, and
federal arrangements. For the most part, however, our members receive their
primary irrigation water supplies from the Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation).
In essence, we are Reclamation’s customers. Western family farms and ranches
of the semi-arid and arid West– as well as the communities that they are
intertwined with – owe their existence, in large part, to the certainty
provided by water stored and delivered by Reclamation projects.
My
family operates a cattle, sheep and hay ranch in the Little Snake River Valley
on the Wyoming-Colorado border. I am a former member of
The topic of this oversight hearing is not only tremendously important to the
Family Farm Alliance, it also is immediately relevant to me and other
Overview
The retention of existing water
supplies and the development of critically needed new supplies are of the utmost
importance throughout the West. Drought and population growth have accelerated
the arrival of inevitable water shortages. Supplies
are already inadequate for the growing demands, but very few plans exist to
develop supplies to meet increasing needs. At
the federal level, we are told that the big dam-building era is over.
This may indeed be true, but it is also plainly and painfully true that
there isn’t enough water to meet the needs of agriculture, urban growth and
the environment. Increased
conservation and efficiency can help, but they are only part -- a small part --
of the solution. And buying and
bullying water away from farmers isn’t the solution either.
Meeting the current and future water needs of the West will require a
thoughtful combination of means, not the least of which is the creation of new
storage.
The Importance of Certainty in
Western Water Policy
The goal of certainty is perhaps the
most important aspect of Western water policy. Billions of public and private
dollars have been invested in existing water supply systems. This infrastructure
relies on legal priorities protecting the use of the water supplies provided by
these systems. Without certainty, those investments in water supply facilities
will be less efficient, and otherwise beneficial investments will not be made
because of the fear that water supplies will be taken away. Other investments
will be made, but wasted, because the expected water supply is reallocated to
other purposes. The loss of supplies will have a significant, if not
devastating, economic effect on those who lose the benefit of their investment.
In addition, if the certainty that
is intended to be provided under existing laws is eroded, the unavoidable
consequences follow:
1.
An increase in conflict
between stakeholders;
2.
Development of
replacement and future supplies in a manner which minimizes any federal nexus,
which often means that irrigated agriculture is "dried up" to obtain
water for urban growth;
3.
The loss of irrigated
agriculture surrounding urban areas, which often means that the most effective
mechanism for preserving open space is eliminated. Experience shows us that when
the water is taken off of irrigated lands in close proximity to urban areas, the
land is soon subdivided for development;
4.
Destabilization of the
market in water rights, which inhibits voluntary transfers to the highest and
best use of the resource; and
5.
Impairment of local
economies that are largely dependent on irrigated agriculture and secondary
adverse impacts to businesses, local governments and schools.
There is an important place for
environmental benefits within the realm of western water project operations or
goals. However, "demand management" strategies that are merely
re-allocation/taking mechanisms in disguise will not lead to true resolution of
conflicts over water use in the West. To merely swing the policy pendulum for
the benefit of one interest at the expense of, or risk to, others-particularly
without first establishing a credible foundation for that interest's alleged
needs-does not lead to the attainment of the goal of a "positive sum"
game where all interests benefit from the new approach.
Demand
Management vs. Supply Management
Conservation (i.e. “demand
management”) is often seen as the solution to water supply issues. In fact, in
the past fifteen years, tremendous agricultural conservation efforts have been
undertaken throughout the West, from installation of high technology drip
irrigation systems in
While conservation is surely a tool
that can assist in overcoming water supply problems, it cannot be viewed as the
single answer to water shortages. Conserved water cannot realistically be
applied to instream uses, as it will more likely be put to beneficial use by the
next downstream appropriator or held in carryover storage for the following
irrigation season. Moreover, mandated or "one size fits all"
conservation programs are doomed to failure in light of the drastically
different circumstances of water users across the West.
Farmers and
ranchers will continue to do all they can to save water. I have included as an
attachment to this written testimony two photos illustrating an example of a
streambank restoration project completed on my ranch. However, water saving
cannot be expanded indefinitely without reducing acreage in production. At some
point, the growing water demands of the West – coupled with the omnipresent
possibility of drought – must be met. The members of the Subcommittee must
understand that in the West, the water needed to meet these demands will either
come from developing new water supplies….or it will be taken from agriculture.
The
reality is that in the western
Appropriate
Role of the Federal Government in These Endeavors
The federal government should adopt
a policy of supporting new efforts to enhance water supplies and encouraging
state and local interests to take the lead in the formulation of those efforts.
Local interests have shown enormous creativity in designing creative water
development projects; my fellow witnesses on this panel will provide you the
best sense of the range of creativity that can be generated at the local level. While
onstream storage should not be seen as unacceptable, offstream storage,
groundwater banking, and countless other forms of water development should be
encouraged as a matter of federal policy and law. Local problems call for local
solutions.
The existing procedures for
developing additional supplies should also be revised to make project approval
less burdensome. By the time project applicants approach federal agencies for
authorization to construct multi-million dollar projects, they have already
invested extensive resources toward analyzing project alternatives to determine
which project is best suited to their budgetary constraints. However,
current procedure dictates that federal agencies formulate another list of
project alternatives which the applicant must assess, comparing potential
impacts with the preferred alternative. These
alternatives often conflict with state law. Opportunities
should be explored to expedite this process and reduce the costs to the project
applicant.
The
example of the permitting history of the Little Snake River
Irrigation Water Supply Project, High Savery Dam and Reservoir – attached to
this testimony – best illustrates this matter.
In addition, the current mitigation
procedure for federal agencies should be reviewed to determine the feasibility
of clarifying and standardizing mitigation requirements. Currently, requirements
for one project become the standard for all subsequent projects. Since no two
projects are the same, federal agencies tend to impose increasingly severe
mitigation requirements on new projects. The end result is that applicants end
up spending tremendous amounts of money for potentially uncertain mitigation.
The example of the city of
Another possible solution is the
creation of mitigation banking. Under such an approach, applicants faced with
excessive mitigation costs would be allowed to pay a reasonable sum per acre to
a regional mitigation bank or set aside mitigation lands as a condition to
implementation of their project. The federal government should encourage the
creation and use of public and private mitigation banks.
Funding
The
President and Congress will prioritize whatever federal funds are available to
meet existing and future needs. As for the rest of the capital, it must come
either from state and local governments or from the private sector. If the
federal government cannot fund the required investments, it should take
meaningful steps to provide incentives for non-federal entities to fill the
void, and remove barriers to the new ways of doing business that will be
required. The fact that water rights reside in state law must always be taken
into account.
For
example, most water supply entities are willing to make investments to meet
human and environmental needs, but they need to know up front that the federal
government will honor its part of the bargain. This means that the federal
government should enter into meaningful contracts that protect the expectations
of the non-federal parties, and concepts like the “No Surprises Rule” under
the Endangered Species Act must be validated and expanded. Entities like
California’s Bay Delta Authority, which is responsible for investing billions
of dollars of state and local funds in a program to achieve water supply and
environmental goals, should be provided with appropriate assurances after
compliance with all permitting requirements that the regulatory goal line will
be moved only in the most extraordinary circumstances and not just because a
GS-9 biologist has new data or a new theory.
The
Western Water Supply Enhancement Study
The
Board of Directors of the Family Farm Alliance in the past year launched an
aggressive and forward looking project that pulled together a master data base
of potential water supply enhancement projects from throughout the West. The
"Western Water Supply Enhancement Study" is the
The
Our
goal was to gather together water supply enhancement ideas from around the West
and put them into one master data base. We went to the people closest to the
ground, at the forefront of Western resources conflicts. We asked them: What are
your ideas? Are you aware of water supply enhancement projects in your region
that have been proposed, and possibly even designed, but that remain on a
bookshelf in some government office? How
are you solving water supply conflicts?
What
this initiative provides is a sophisticated data base that is essentially a 21st
century “book of ideas”. What it is not is a list of supply
enhancement projects recommended for implementation by the
In
an age where more dams are being torn down then being constructed – even
though Western water demands are growing every year - many people shudder when
the “D” word is uttered. However, the types of projects contained in the
Western Water Supply Enhancement Study database are not monstrous dams like
Along
with basic information, the database that was generated from the compilation of
the survey has a Global Information System (GIS) element and includes pictures,
maps and a description of up to 500 words for each project or proposal. New GIS
format technology is embedded that permits viewers to see a map of 17 Western
states and then "drill down" to see map details of a project area.
The Initiative should show that, in most
areas of the West, water resources are available and waiting to be developed.
However, the policies of the federal government make development of that
water nearly impossible. Water wars
are being fought throughout the West simply because we have not had the vision
to develop new, environmentally sound, sources of water.
We
believe this report will help catalyze the discussion on future water supply
enhancement throughout the arid West. Today,
we are making copies of the CD-ROM available to congressional committees,
agricultural interests, and conservation groups for their review. We
welcome all constructive comments.
Conclusion
Urbanization and competition for water supplies are driving
Western farmers off the land at a time when American food production in general
is following other industries “off-shore” in search of lower costs.
Traditional farms and ranches are disappearing, and next year this
country will become a net importer of food for the first time in our history. Are
there any dangers in this? Victor Davis Hanson, a classicist and historian at
the Hoover Institution,
“At first glance, no. Shoppers
have more food, season round, at cheaper prices than ever. Obesity, not famine,
is
Yet there is an insidious cultural
cost to the end of agrarianism that we hardly appreciate. The family on its own
land, using craft to work with nature, was a model practical steward of the
environment.
In short, sober American farmers
were a calming antidote to almost everything that makes us uneasy with popular
culture, from gangsta rap and Martha Stewart to Enron and the hyped trial of
Scott Peterson.
No, we will not starve without
these crusty farmers, but we sure will miss them.”
However, more pressing arguments exist. The
Further, Thompson said he worries “every single night”
about threats to the American food supply.
Crusty farmers may well be an American icon, but in fact
our citizens could starve without them. For farmers to survive; for food to be
produced in
Family farmers and ranchers require certain water supplies as a base condition of their existence. We cannot continue to wish away the reality that there is not enough water to meet our needs in drought years, and 20 years from now, if something is not done, every year will essentially be a drought year. We cannot continue long-term hypothetical processes that focus primarily on continued conservation and downsizing of Western agriculture.
In summary, while on-stream storage should not be seen as unacceptable,
off-stream storage, groundwater banking, and countless other forms of water
development should be encouraged as a matter of federal policy and law. The
construction of additional water supply infrastructure may allow more efficient
management and enable greater cooperation between traditional and
non-traditional water users. Federal
agencies have a role to play in infrastructure development, but interference
with or duplication of state authorities must be minimized.
Family farmers and ranchers, like me, need you to tell us
that you want us to keep doing what we are doing. Do you really want farmers and
ranchers to continue to work the land? If not, we can disengage from our fight
to try to build the water supply certainty we need to keep us in business. If
so – please help us strengthen federal
water policy to provide certainty to all water users; agricultural, tribal,
municipal, industrial and environmental, who are dependent on commitments made
by the government. Western
irrigated agriculture is a strategic national resource, and the role of the
federal government in the 21st Century should be to protect and
enhance that resource.
Thank you.
Attachment List:
1.
Permitting History of the Little
2.
3.
Figure
1: Example of Family Farm
4.
Figures
2 and 3: “Before” and “After” Photographs of
Attachment
1: Permitting History of the Little
High Savery Dam and Reservoir
Introduction
Permitting is a major step in any project that requires
federal agency action; it can be the most perplexing and confusing step in
project development. Projects
requiring federal actions must go through the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) assessment process, which in itself is not a permitting process but is of
utmost importance concerning whether required permits will eventually be issued.
Due to extensive/thorough NEPA screening requirements and alternative
evaluations, projects often lose direction and focus during this process.
NEPA was enacted in 1969 to promote informed decisions and
public disclosure of federal actions. Through NEPA assessments other laws such
as the Endangered Species Act, Clean Water Act, Fish and Wildlife Coordination
Act, and the National Historic Preservation Act come into play.
These laws and acts require permits or clearances from a number of
agencies, and make coordination of the NEPA process the driving force for
project permitting. This was
especially true for the Little Snake River Irrigation Supplemental Water Supply
Project.
The following sections discuss major events that occurred
during permitting of the Little Snake River Irrigation Water Supply Project and
present conclusions and lessons learned from this process.
The history and conclusions presented are a compilation of information
from legislative reports, project studies and personal recollections.
History
The Little Snake Irrigation Water Supply Project began as
the Sandstone Dam Project and now is commonly referred to as the High Savery Dam
and Reservoir Project. The Sandstone
Dam Project began as mitigation for the Cheyenne Stage I, II and III projects
and to provide additional water storage for industrial development.
The Wyoming Legislature authorized the Cheyenne Stage I and II projects
in 1979 and 1980 and also instructed the Wyoming Water Development Commission
(WWDC) to look at the feasibility of developing storage in the Little
Snake River Basin to address in-basin agricultural, recreational and municipal
needs.
Studies were initiated to evaluate dam and reservoir sites
in the basin and the Sandstone site was selected as the preferred site.
In 1984, the legislature authorized a project in the Little Snake River
Basin to mitigate and alleviate any water supply shortages caused by the
Cheyenne Stage I and II projects. Sandstone
Dam was to impound 52,000 acre-feet of water behind a 200-foot high structure.
The reservoir would have had a 32,000 acre-foot annual yield with 12,000
acre-feet allocated for irrigation and 20,000 acre-feet allocated for future
industrial development.
After several years of study, the permitting process for
the Sandstone Project was initiated in 1986.
An application for a Clean Water Act, Section 404 Permit (404 Permit) was
filed with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps), which initiated the NEPA
assessment process. The project was
of a scale that an environmental impact statement (EIS) was necessary; the Corps
was the lead agency for the NEPA review and for preparation of the EIS.
The draft EIS and biological assessment (for assessment of impacts to
endangered species) were published in January 1988.
Six action alternatives and the no action alternative were evaluated.
The six action alternatives included four reservoirs, a ground water
development alternative and a water conservation alternative.
The preferred alternative, for the state and the sponsor, was the
Sandstone Dam and Reservoir Project. All of the alternatives were sized to allow
storage of 12,000 acre-feet of irrigation water and 20,000 acre-feet for future
industrial development. A supplement
to the Draft EIS was published in April 1989 to support need for storage of
20,000 acre-feet for future industrial use.
Work continued on the EIS process during 1989 and 1990.
On
During 1991, the Little Snake River Basin Planning Study
was authorized by the WWDC and legislature. This study was completed in October
1992. One task of the study was to evaluate potential reservoir sites to
determine whether any were capable of meeting the supplemental irrigation water
needs in the Little Snake River Basin. At
the request of the Savery-Little Snake Water Conservancy District (District), a
downsized version of the Sandstone Project was included among the alternatives.
The Commission recommended construction funding for a
smaller Sandstone Dam and Reservoir project; this downsized version would
possess a water storage capacity of 23,000 acre-feet, which would yield 12,000
acre-feet per year of supplemental irrigation water.
Legislation was approved during the 1993 session to provide $30,000,000
to construct the project. The
project purpose, as defined by the legislature, was to serve as an agricultural,
municipal and domestic water supply; the project was to also increase
recreational opportunities, provide environmental enhancements, and serve as
mitigation water for shortages caused by the Cheyenne Stage I, II, and III
trans-basin diversion water supply projects.
Additional studies
were conducted in 1993 to determine the suitability of the Sandstone site.
The report concluded dam construction at the Sandstone site was
technically feasible. In 1994, the
WWDC began the permitting process for construction of a smaller project,
including a downsized Sandstone Dam and Reservoir project and several other
potential alternatives. The
downsized Sandstone Dam was the preferred alternative.
Since the scope of the project had changed, the results of the draft EIS
published in 1988 could not be used. The
WWDC entered into an agreement with the Corps and contracted with Burns and
McDonnell to complete a new third party EIS.
The Corps advised
the WWDC, District and valley residents in January 1995 that a 404 Permit could
be issued only for the least environmentally damaging alternative.
That summer the Corps indicated that the least damaging practicable
alternative was a combination of two alternative reservoirs (Dutch Joe and Big
Gulch); therefore, a 404 Permit would not be issued for the Sandstone Dam
alternative. The Corps had narrowly
defined the purpose and need for the project as supplemental late season
irrigation water supply. The
Corps’ definition conflicted with the
In August 1995, the
WWDC director and project manager explained to the WWDC and Select Water
Committee of the Wyoming Legislature reasons why the EIS was stalled, which was
largely attributable to the lack of support for alternatives other than the
Sandstone site. The WWDC and
the Select Water Committee concluded that alternatives to the Sandstone Dam and
Reservoir should be considered if there was a clear consensus of support for
other alternatives. Public meetings
were held in the Little Snake Valley in August, October and December 1995 for
the purposes of discussing project alternatives.
It was apparent that a majority of those attending the meetings preferred
the construction of Sandstone Dam, since they believed that the Sandstone site
would provide more multiple use benefits than the other alternatives.
This majority also disagreed with the Corps decision not to include other
project purposes, which were mandated by the legislature, within the Corps’
purpose and need analysis.
The WWDC supported the position expressed by a majority of
the Little Snake Valley residents and directed the WWDC staff to further pursue
changing the purpose and need section of the EIS to include state
legislature’s mandated purposes, particularly recreation.
The lack of agreement between the state and the Corps, concerning the
project’s purpose and need, resulted in further delay of the project.
In 1996, The WWDC contracted with Burns and McDonnell to
complete an analysis of need for additional flat-water recreation in the Baggs,
Adding to other problems, the Sandstone Dam alternative was
the most costly project (about $48 million).
The Dutch Joe alternative was nearly $10 million less costly. The High
Savery alternative was the least costly at about $30 million.
Environmental impacts were greatest at Sandstone but appeared to be
significant at the Dutch Joe and High Savery sites as well.
A meeting to discuss the project, attended by representatives of the
Corps, other federal agencies, several state agencies, the Governors
office, representatives from the District, other representatives from
The permitting process was put back on track in 1997 and
three alternatives were selected that would meet the specified need for the
project, which was to supply 12,000 acre-feet of supplemental irrigation water
to the users in the Little Snake River Valley 8 out of 10 years.
The alternatives studied were a downsized Sandstone Dam and Reservoir,
Dutch Joe Dam and Reservoir, and High Savery Dam and Reservoir.
High Savery became the preferred alternative.
The final studies were completed during 1997 and 1998 and the Draft EIS
was published in August 1998. The
Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act report was also released in August 1998.
Public meetings were held and comments were taken on the
draft EIS in the fall of 1998. Disagreements
between the WWDC, the WGFD, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and the Corps on
how best to address the DEIS comments delayed the completion of the Final EIS
until October 1999. The U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service issued the Biological Opinion in July 1999 to satisfy the
consultation requirements of Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act.
In order that a Record of Decision (ROD) could be issued, work began in
earnest in 1999 to mitigate the project’s adverse environmental impacts.
Numerous meetings were held with the Wyoming Game and Fish Department,
WWDC, USFWS, Savery-Little Snake Water Conservancy District and Corps to resolve
differences and finalize the plan.
The Final EIS, completed in October 1999, identified the
High Savery Project as the preferred alternative.
Several comments were received but none were significant.
These few comments were eventually addressed in the Corps’ Record of
Decision (ROD). However, the project
was further delayed because the Corps was concerned about issuing the ROD and
404 Permit before cultural resource preservation and management issues were
resolved.
Efforts to comply with the National Historic Preservation
Act, which protects cultural resources, were also underway at this time.
A number of site visits, conference calls, and meetings were conducted to
discuss cultural resource issues with interested Native American Tribes, the
Wyoming State Historic Preservation Office (SHPO), WWDC and the Corps.
There were a variety of tasks undertaken to satisfy the requirements of
the Tribes and SHPO. Several
cultural sites had to be evaluated and protection plans developed. One site
required excavation and interpretation. This work was conducted during 1999 and
2000. A final Programmatic Agreement
to protect and manage cultural resources on the High Savery Site, which took
over a year to negotiate, was eventually signed in early December 2000.
The plan to mitigate the adverse impacts to wetlands,
uplands and riparian areas proved to be extremely controversial, which further
delayed the project. Three drafts of
the plan were completed and debated by all parties involved.
In October 2000 a final draft plan was presented to the Corps by WWDC.
This plan was finally approved in December 2000 after a meeting with the
Corps at their District headquarters in
The ROD was issued
Conclusions and Lessons Learned
It could be concluded from the Little Snake Supplemental
Irrigation Supply Project (High Savery Project) history that 14 or more years
might be required for permitting reservoir projects.
However, that may not be correct. During
the time the High Savery Project was being permitted several other reservoir
projects within
We often learn more from mistakes than we do from
successes; in this regard there are a number of lessons that can be gained from
the Sandstone/Little Snake Supplemental Irrigation Water Supply Project/High
Savery Dam and Reservoir permitting process.
The determination of purpose and need under federal guidelines restricts
planning opportunities and purposes for which a project may be permitted.
The state’s acceptance of a project that yields less than a firm supply
should be questioned. This
acceptance results in less utility for the state and for the project’s
beneficiaries. A better approach
would be to maximize the basin’s available hydrology or at least meet the
firm-yield requirements of the sponsor. If
the basin hydrology cannot provide the firm yield, the decision to construct the
project should rest with the state and sponsor and should not become a reason
for permit denial by the Corps. Further,
the state should encourage its Congressional delegation to sponsor legislation
that would allow the state’s legislative and planning process to be considered
in establishing purpose and need for construction of dam and reservoir projects.
If Congress is unwilling to expand the state’s role in
establishing the purpose or need for a project, the project sponsor and the
state must work within existing guidelines to maximize opportunities.
Working within either existing or expanded federal guidelines would
facilitate the NEPA analysis, from which all other permitting processes will
tier. The 20,000 acre-feet of water
storage for future industrial development that couldn’t be definitively
described in the early Sandstone Project was a permitting problem.
There was no specific purpose or need described for the 20,000 acre-feet
of industrial water. Therefore, the Corps felt that justification for building a
reservoir having this extra capacity and additional adverse environmental impact
was unwarranted. However, it is
incumbent on the state and potential project sponsors not to lose sight of
future demands for water that may only be addressed by constructing new dam and
reservoir projects. The challenge
will be to convince regulators, during the permitting process, that the benefits
of constructing a proposed future project outweigh the adversities;
consequently, there is a justifiable “purpose and need” for the project.
Developing a reasonable range of alternatives is also very
important in project planning and the NEPA process.
Alternatives must meet the need and purpose for the project and must be
capable of being implemented. It is
important to use the NEPA process to help determine the most appropriate
alternative from the set of reasonable alternatives.
Although the Sandstone Project started with a set of alternatives the one
seriously considered was the Sandstone Dam and Reservoir alternative.
When the Corps determined that the Sandstone alternative could not be
permitted, the permitting process stalled because other alternatives had not
been seriously considered. Even
after the project was downsized to match the need, the State, District, and
valley residents wanted to maintain the Sandstone alternative as the preferred
alternative. This caused permitting
delays.
The permitting process did not proceed until a reasonable
range of alternatives was developed. Once
a reasonable range of alternatives, including the High Savery alternative, was
developed, the project moved forward to a conclusion within an acceptable
timeframe. In other words, the
alternative site and project evaluations undertaken in 1996 put permitting back
on track in 1997. The state
successfully secured the permit to construct High Savery in December 2000.
Cooperative efforts are important for moving projects
through the NEPA and permitting processes. The
WWDC and local sponsors should become cooperating agencies in the NEPA process
if possible and if not, should be allowed to serve on the project EIS
interdisciplinary team. The Corps
wasted a great deal of time making decisions on the project and at times seemed
unable to make decisions. These
delays not only postponed the project, they resulted in wasted money.
Disagreements at the state and local level also contributed to delays,
and led to additional costly studies and analyses.
Establishing working relationships with the agencies
involved in the NEPA process and permitting is important to keep the project on
schedule and to avoid costly delays and disagreements.
It is impossible to eliminate all problems associated with permitting dam
and reservoir projects, but good cooperation and communications between agencies
and groups, with an understanding of each participant’s expectations, will
help in problem resolution.
Dam and reservoir projects are complex and often controversial, a dedicated local sponsor or project proponent and a documented “purpose and need” are minimum requirements for success. The primary reason the High Savery Dam was permitted and constructed is the persistence and perseverance of the Savery-Little Snake Water Conservancy District and the residents of the valley. The sponsor’s and the state’s staying power prevailed in the end.
Attachment 2:
The example of the city of
The Buffalo Municipal Reservoir
Project is developing a small municipal supply storage reservoir in the
A Level 11 - Phase I report was
completed in March 1989. The report concluded that the preferred development
option included a dam and reservoir at the Lower Tie Hack site on South Clear
Creek, a tributary of Clear Creek. The recommended reservoir size is 2,425 acre-
feet and the estimated cost of the dam and reservoir is $10,650,000. The
reservoir will inundate approximately 60 acres in total, including 8.8 acres of
wetlands. In addition, the report indicated that installation of a $975.000
hydropower generation unit at the downstream end of the city's water supply
pipeline could be economically advantageous. The hydropower unit is addressed as
a separate project, but construction of both components is required if the total
project is to be economically feasible. The report also noted that the
feasibility of the project would depend on the successful transfer of
The process of permitting this
facility began in the early summer of 1992. The arduous and expensive process of
obtaining final permits was not completed for nearly 4 years. The Forest Service
special use permit was issued on
The mitigation for the 8.8 acres of
wetlands has cost in excess of $1 million. The primary reason the costs for
mitigation to the City of
Attachment
3: Figure
1
- Example of Family Farm
Attachment 4: Figures 2 and 3: “Before” and “After” photos
of
Undertaken by